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INTRODUCTION
Philippe De Brabanter
Institut Jean Nicod, CNRS-EHESS-ENS
This thematic issue of the BJL originated in the renewed interest in quotation-
related matters over the last fifteen years or so. This period has seen the
publication of an impressive list of significant papers, especially in journals
devoted to the philosophy of language. These papers have aimed at doing
mainly three things: recapitulating and assessing existing theories of quotation,
submitting new problems that any account of quotation should be able to deal
with, and developing new theories capable of addressing these issues.
Among the new problems that theorists have been concerned with, the so-
called ‘hybrid’ uses take pride of place. These are the instances in which a
single linguistic sequence appears to be used and mentioned simultaneously, as
in:
(1) Then Ned had the fucking nerve to tell me that “under the
circumstances” I’d been brilliant. (S. Fry 2001. The Stars’ Tennis
Balls. Arrow books, p. 83)
Next to being used (= fulfilling its ordinary adverbial function), the sequence
‘ “under the circumstances” ’ also mentions an expression whose utterance is
presumably attributed to Ned. This contrasts with less complex cases:
(2) “Tickle” is my favourite verb.
Here, ‘ “Tickle” ’ contributes a single, straightforward, meaning: it mentions
the word “tickle”.
In an important recent paper, François Recanati (2001) distinguished
between ‘closed’ cases like (2), where a quotation is ‘recruited’ syntactically as
a singular term (a referring NP), and ‘open’ cases like (1), where it is not so
recruited (the quoted words have the same function they would have if they
were not quoted). Hybrid uses form an important sub-category of open
quotations. They can be further split into ‘mixed quotations’ (cf. Cappelen &
Lepore 1997) and ‘scare quoting’. Cases of mixed quotation typically involve a
reporting verb and speech attribution to the referent of the subject of that verb,
as in (1). They essentially look like a blend of direct and indirect speech. As for
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scare quoting, typically a means for distancing oneself from the use of an
expression, it requires neither a reporting verb nor speech attribution to the
referent of a sentential constituent. Both mixed quotation and scare quoting
have proved particularly challenging for theorists of quotation. Together, they
form the subject matter of this issue of the BJL.
The proposed procedure
In view of the many existing accounts of quotation, there appeared to be a need
for a fruitful confrontation of the theories. That is how the idea came up of
inviting writers to participate in a thematic issue devoted to mixed quotation
and scare quoting. Potential contributors were chosen on the basis of their
credentials in the study of quotation. The plan was to provide them with a
series of carefully selected examples, and ask them to address at least some of
those (or analogous examples) in their essays. To this editor’s delight, the
proposal was received enthusiastically by most of the authors approached.
(Those who turned down the invitation mostly did so because of other
commitments, not because they thought the whole project futile.) Here are the
original seven examples:
(4) Gerald said that he would “consider running for the Presidency”. (J.
Searle 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge University Press, p. 185)
(5) Politicians, with their speeches on “la fracture sociale”, will simply
promise reforms and still more laws. (Times Literary Supplement, May 3,
2002, p. 12)
(6) If you were a French academic, you might say that the parrot was un
symbole du Logos. (J. Barnes 1985. Flaubert’s Parrot. Picador, p. 18)
(7) Each tablet in the war cemetery would commemorate Monsieur Un
Tel, lâchement assassiné par les Allemands, or tué, or fusillé, and
then an insulting modern date : 1943, 1944, 1945. (J. Barnes 1996.
Cross Channel. Picador, p. 105)
(8) Descartes said that man “is a thinking substance”. (Tsohatzidis 1998 :
662)
(9) Like Luther, Lucian Freud seems to attest that “Here I stand, I can
do no other.” (New Statesman & Society, Sept. 17, 1993, p. 33)
(10) Naturally John Lennon was expelled and sent to art school, “so I can
fail there as well”. (Guardian Weekly, Nov. 2-8, 2000, p. 13)
The quotations in these examples are all hybrid in the sense that they do
‘double-duty’ (cf. Davidson 1979: 92): they play a linguistic role both as
quotations and independently of being quotations. This implies that, unlike
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what can be observed in closed cases, the quoted sequences would still fulfil a
syntactic and semantic role even if they were deprived of any quotational
dimension. Clearest in this respect is (4): if, for the sake of argument, any trace
of quoting is removed, you get a well-formed and interpretable indirect speech
report. This can be shown by deleting the quote marks:1
(4’) Gerald said that he would consider running for the Presidency.
The seven examples above were expected to trigger discussion of a number
of topics. First, all of the sentences, somehow or other, seemed to raise issues
concerning the division of labour between semantics and pragmatics. Second,
it was not clear if the distinction between mixed quotation and scare quoting
would survive scrutiny. That is because some examples including no verb of
saying seem to involve speech attribution to an individual mentioned by a
sentential constituent (cf. (9) and (10)), just as much as some of the sentences
with a reporting verb (cf. (6)). Third, it was assumed that subsets of examples
would prompt contributors to address more ‘local’ questions. Thus, examples
(5), (6) and (7) were intended to draw attention to grammatical and semantic
well-formedness, in particular to questions like “Can an utterance in which
foreign words are apparently used be a grammatical sentence of English?” and
“Does the presence of quote marks or italics affect grammatical and semantic
well-formedness?”. But they were also thought likely to spark a debate about
shifts in one or the other parameter of the context, notably the language
parameter. Example (8) was meant to focus attention on the notions of
‘iconicity’ and ‘sametokening’, that is, those concepts used in the literature to
capture the assumed resemblance between a quoted sequence and that which it
depicts. As for examples (9) and (10), they were brought in to encourage
consideration both of grammatical well-formedness and of shifts in the
situation of utterance.
In the end, not all of the above topics have attracted the same amount of
interest. This, however, does not mean that they are not all of significance. In
the next five sections, I indicate in which respects hybrid quotations help refine
our understanding of the issues brought up in the previous paragraph. I also
briefly sketch how the various writers have addressed them (when they have).
The main issues
The semantics-pragmatics interface
Comparison between (4) and its quotationless counterpart suggests that the two
utterances do not convey exactly the same meaning. The question is whether
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the difference between them is semantic or pragmatic. Here, we connect with
an area of research that is currently very much alive in the philosophy of
language and linguistics. There is a vigorous debate as to where, and on what
criteria, the line should be drawn between the semantic and the pragmatic
domains. The role of context, the meaning of indexicals, so-called
‘unarticulated constituents’ stand out as typical topics on which the dispute
centres. This collection of essays shows that the study of quotation too can
shed some useful light on the controversy.
In line with expectations, the division of labour between semantics and
pragmatics has been attended to by many contributors. Most agree that the
impact of plain quotations on the meaning of an utterance is essentially
semantic (cf. (2)). But major divergences emerge with respect to hybrid cases,
especially mixed quotation. Some writers think that this category has a largely
semantic impact too (Benbaji, Cappelen & Lepore, García-Carpintero, Gómez-
Torrente). (Though Geurts & Maier take no explicit stand on this, their
presentation of the search for an echoed speaker as linguistically controlled
puts them in this camp too.) Others believe the impact to be mainly pragmatic
(Abbott, Reimer (with reservations), Saka). The ‘semanticists’ often argue that
our intuitions about the truth-conditions of (4) and (4’) prove them right:
whereas, it seems, (4’) is true even if Gerald uttered the sentence “I’m thinking
of taking part in the election”, (4) appears to be false with respect to the same
situation.
There are several possible responses for the ‘pragmaticist’. The first
consists in allowing that mixed quotations do affect the truth-conditions of
utterances, but adding at once that this does not mean that the impact of these
quotations is semantic. Indeed, a distinction is drawn between two levels of
truth-conditions: traditional, purely semantic, truth-conditions vs. truth-
conditions involving ‘pragmatic intrusions’. On this picture, though mixed
quotations have a truth-conditional import, it is none the less pragmatic in
character. (This is the position advocated in Recanati 2001, in accordance with
the sort of ‘truth-conditional pragmatics’ also championed by Carston or
Sperber & Wilson. See Reimer for a discussion).
The second, not incompatible, response consists in showing that (4) is not
false in every context where Gerald said “I’m thinking of taking part in the
election” (cf. Reimer, Saka). As it turns out, the quoted utterance may well be
attributed to someone other than the reported speaker, for example to some
other salient agent in the context of utterance. On such a reading, (4) is rather
an instance of scare quoting than of mixed quotation in the strict sense.
Semanticists, in turn, can offer several counterarguments to this second
response. First, they can acknowledge that speech is not always attributed to
the subject of discourse, and that two interpretations are available. But, they
can add, these two interpretations correspond to two different conventional
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meanings of quotation marks. This view, put forward by Mario Gómez-
Torrente, amounts to positing that quotation marks are ambiguous. A second
counterargument goes as follows: quote marks have a single conventional
meaning, they refer to the enclosed expressions. However, they are sometimes
used with a purely pragmatic purpose. That is what happens in scare quoting.
This position, which rejects any appeal to ambiguity, is defended by Herman
Cappelen & Ernie Lepore. Finally, like Yitzhak Benbaji, semanticists can
claim that, although there are two readings of an utterance like (4) and the
impact of quote marks is semantic on both, there is no actual ambiguity here.
Benbaji offers a subtle, perhaps not uncontroversial, justification of this view.
To close this section on semantics and pragmatics, I would like to mention
a third, more radical, way in which the pragmaticist can deal with the
semanticist’s intuitions-based argument about mixed quotation. Here, the
response consists in dismissing the whole truth-conditional framework as
shaky, arguing that our intuitions about truth and falsity are far from being as
firm as they are usually made out to be. In this perspective (which is Paul
Saka’s), arguments resting chiefly on intuitions about truth-conditions lose a
lot of their potency.
Mixed quotation vs. scare quoting
Not all contributors have chosen to focus on both of these categories. Amongst
those who have, some take the view that they are clearly separate, e.g. Benbaji,
Cappelen & Lepore, Gómez-Torrente. Others, like García-Carpintero, Geurts
& Maier and Saka, believe that the distinction is not clear-cut (or make no
distinction at all), either because it is not underlain by different conventional
meanings or because instances of each category do not serve radically different
pragmatic purposes.
Readers will find no detailed discussion of quotations that do not seem to
fit neatly into either category, i.e. cases like (9) and (10), where there appears
to be definite attribution of an utterance to a speaker designated by a sentential
constituent, even though the clause contains no reporting verb. Examples like
these nevertheless pose a genuine problem to those whose definition of the
semantics of quote marks (for mixed quotation) includes the verb “say”. And
difficulties are compounded by the existence of NPs such as the following:
(11) Her remark that Jewish culture “has been problematic” […].
(www.iccgw.org/letters/singer.shtml)
(12) […] her idea that counties “chart their own course in collective
bargaining.” (starbulletin.com/2003/01/22/editorial/editorials.html)
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Here, a noun appears to support speech attribution. In (11) the noun is deverbal
and should lend itself to some treatment à la Cappelen & Lepore (with a logical
form including the verb “say”). In (12), however, it is not deverbal, and a
similar solution seems more remote. In any case, the distinction between mixed
and scare quoting will require further consideration in future studies.
Grammatical and semantic well-formedness
A sequence that is used performs its ordinary syntactic and semantic functions.
The latter function is usually assumed to depend on the grammatical well-
formedness of the utterance: on a strict reading, only a grammatical utterance
can be semantically interpreted. Since the quotations in (4)-(10) are often
described as instances of simultaneous use and mention, one must be able to
state in which sense the quoted sequences are used. This is no easy task when
the quoted words are not (Standard) English. In his contribution, Stefano
Predelli shows how pseudo-words like “subliminable” and “nucular”,
occurring in mocking scare quotes, can be shown to be used and to contribute
to the semantics of an utterance. His sensible account, however, cannot clearly
be extended to cases like (5) to (7). What does it mean to say that French
sequences like “fracture sociale”, “un symbole du Logos” and “lâchement
assassiné par les Allemands” are used in English utterances like (5) to (7)?
Let us once again perform the test of deleting marks of quotation. From (5),
(6) and (7), we get:
(5’) Politicians, with their speeches on la fracture sociale, will simply
promise reforms and still more laws.
(6’) If you were a French academic, you might say that the parrot was un
symbole du Logos.
(7’) Each tablet in the war cemetery would commemorate Monsieur Un
Tel, lâchement assassiné par les Allemands […].
Many subjects consider these examples ill-formed. It seems, however, that
such judgments rest on at least three assumptions that require further
assessment. The first is that marks of quotation (be it quote marks or italics)
have an impact on the grammaticality of utterances. This, though a perfectly
sensible assumption, is by no means obviously true. There are numerous
instances of plain metalinguistic citation (cf. (2)), both written and spoken,
where no marking is supplied. Now, perhaps some marking is necessary in
hybrid cases. But here too, there seem to be exceptions: allusions to well-
known proverbs or sayings, though often signalled by quote marks or italics,
sometimes occur unmarked:
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(13) Winston Churchill actually read “Mein Kampf,” understood what the
plan was about, wanted to confront it early on, and it was his vision
that won the day and ultimately defeated Hitler, with the help of
America and a lot of blood, toil, sweat, and tears.
(www.unitedfamilies.org/hannity_article.asp)
The phrase “blood, toil, sweat, and tears” was used by Winston Churchill in his
maiden speech to the Commons on May 13, 1940. It is reasonable to assume
that the utterer of (13) is mentioning the phrase as well as using it. But this
mention takes place without any overt marking. In conclusion, the question
whether marks of quotation affect grammaticality is a complex one, as yet
unresolved, and will deserve some consideration in future.
The second assumption underlying judgments that (5’)-(7’) are ill-formed
is that an utterance including an unmarked (quoteless) foreign sequence cannot
be well-formed. Once again, this does not go without saying. For years now,
syntacticians have accepted the grammaticality of utterances containing
‘intrasentential code-switching’, as in “This morning mi hermano y yo fuimos
a comprar some milk” (cf. MacSwan 1997: 49). There is some empirical work
to be done by quotation specialists, to establish (i) if unmarked mixed quoting
of foreign sequences does occur and (ii) if the occurrence of such sequences is
syntactically constrained, i.e. if only some positions in an utterance are
available for a shift to the foreign sequence and back.
As for the third assumption, it simply consists in the belief that removing
the marks amounts to removing the quotation. But this really begs the question.
Whether some marking is necessary for quotation to take place is an empirical
issue. Some account is required for the large body of data where quotation does
seem to occur in the absence of any marking.
Shifts in one or the other parameter of the context
Some writers (e.g. Recanati) explain utterances like (5) to (7) in terms of
language-shifts. In those examples, the pragmatic role of quote marks and
italics is to indicate that the enclosed sequence must be interpreted with respect
to another language (this can be someone else’s idiolect). In Recanati’s view,
the identification of the shift is both a pragmatic and a pre-semantic process. It
is pragmatic because it results from inferences on the context and pre-semantic
because it contributes to determining which sentence has been uttered.
These views come under fire from several authors. Benbaji thinks that
Recanati is wrong in believing recognition of the language-shift to result from
pragmatic inferences: instead, the process is linguistically controlled; the shift
is ‘predicted’ by the conventional meaning of scare quotes. As for Gómez-
Torrente and Saka, they both contend that the postulation of a language-shift in
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(5) to (7) is superfluous, and that these examples can be accounted for in terms
of other, more general, mechanisms.
Regarding examples (9) and (10), Recanati takes it that they are underlain
by another sort of shift, this time in the situation of utterance. Once again, this
shift is assumed to be pre-semantic and pragmatic in character. Cappelen &
Lepore provide some strong criticism of this picture. For them, Recanati’s
appeal to pre-semantic mechanisms here is nothing short of a ‘snow-job’, i.e.
an attempt at obscuring the fact that the behaviour of indexicals proves mixed
quotation to have a semantic impact. Samuel Cumming’s paper, which is
devoted to an original dynamic-semantics analysis of examples like (9) and
(10), may help readers assess the respective arguments.
Iconicity, sametokening
The issue of the similarity between a quotation and what it depicts hovers in
the background of most of the papers. Cappelen & Lepore’s concept of
‘sametokening’ (a quotation is a token of the same kind as its referent) comes
in for severe criticism from Marga Reimer and, especially, Savas Tsohatzidis.
One problem they see is that sametokening may be so loosely defined that its
application cannot be proved incorrect. Tsohatzidis tries to show additionally
that the flexibility that Cappelen & Lepore allow for their notion of
sametokening actually threatens their whole theoretical edifice, hence that they
had better give up the claim that the English quotation in (8) sametokens a
Latin utterance by Descartes.
For his part, Paul Saka offers an interesting discussion of what he calls the
‘Verbatim Assumption’, which, he thinks, is at work in many theories of
quotation. He adduces several arguments to show that this presupposition is
untenable. Judging from some cautious statements in the other papers, his
message has been well received.
The 11 papers
This issue contains eleven contributions. Together, they give readers a fair
picture of the state of the art in the study of quotation. The main strength of the
collection is its homogeneity, which makes possible a genuine comparative
evaluation of the various theories. This is all the more so because contributors
have been willing to read drafts of each other’s papers and to offer comments
on them.
Inevitably, more scholars should have been given an opportunity to explain
their views in these pages, but various factors (space, time, personal ignorance,
etc.) have resulted in the absence of some prominent names. I am not going to
list these here, lest I might do injustice to still more writers. All the same, I am
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keenly aware that this issue would have been even better had these writers
taken part.
As all the papers deal with essentially the same topics, there seemed to be
no reason to attempt a thematic rearrangement. The order of presentation is
therefore alphabetical. Here is an outline of the eleven essays.
Barbara ABBOTT offers a defence of François Recanati’s (2001) theory of
quotation. However, she also shows that Recanati’s notion of syntactic
recruitment cannot be restricted to referring NPs: some quotations appear to be
recruited as Nouns and Adjective Phrases, notably. Next, she discusses some of
the points on which it seems that Recanati’s theory of open quotation does
better than the accounts presented in Cappelen & Lepore (1997) and Saka
(1998). Finally, she points up the existence of another intriguing variety of
quotation, which she labels ‘non-citational quotation’, and offers suggestions
for analysis.
Yitzhak BENBAJI argues for a semantic account of quotation marks. He
uses apparent flaws in Recanati’s framework to support his claim that a
semantic theory is necessary. Regarding mixed quotation, Benbaji adopts
Cappelen & Lepore’s views, even though he disagrees as to which examples
count as mixed quotation (e.g. ‘Alice said that Nicola is a “philtosopher” ’). As
regards scare quoting, which he describes as ‘using others’ words’, Benbaji
makes this interesting suggestion: scare quotes indicate that the enclosed
expression is to be interpreted in the way some echoed speaker interprets it.
This is what the descriptive meaning of scare quotes amounts to. In this sense,
they are just like indexicals: they instruct the addressee to look in the context
for an echoed speaker. This echoed speaker, Benbaji adds, is part of the
‘Kaplanian’ (semantic) context, just as well as the utterer, the addressee, the
place and time of utterance.
Herman CAPPELEN and Ernie LEPORE restate and defend the views
presented in their (1997) paper. They mount an attack against pragmatic
accounts of mixed quotation, especially Recanati’s, arguing notably that the
non-cancellability of speech attribution and the behaviour of indexicals (cf. our
examples (9) and (10)) establish the need for a semantic theory. For the first
time, they also offer an account of scare quoting, which they regard as very
different from mixed quotation. Whereas the latter affects the semantics of an
utterance, scare quoting only affects its pragmatics. Scare quoting thus falls
under the heading of ‘speech-act heuristics’, i.e. non-semantic aspects that
contribute to the speech-act content of an utterance or highlight some part of
this speech-act content. In this category, scare quoting belongs together with
such paralinguistic phenomena as an ironic tone of voice, winking an eye or a
mocking imitation.
Samuel CUMMING’s paper is one of the two contributions to formal
semantics in this issue. Cumming focuses entirely on cases like our (9) and
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(10). He compares two existing formal accounts of quotation (Geurts & Maier,
Bittner) and concludes that Bittner’s is superior because, unlike Geurts &
Maier’s, it does not make the incorrect prediction that only syntactic
constituents can be mix-quoted. Cumming then shows how Bittner’s
framework can be used to account for mixed quotations containing indexicals.
Manuel GARCÍA-CARPINTERO elaborates on the ‘deferred ostension’ theory
of quotation presented in his (1994) paper. This is a Davidsonian, hence also a
semantic, account of quotation. García-Carpintero begins by highlighting some
important features of the behaviour of indexicals. He then goes on to argue that
quotations work like deferred ostensions, namely cases of ostension in which
the demonstratum is not the referent: typically, the referent of a quotation is an
expression-type, and the expression-token occurring between the quote marks
(the demonstratum) is an index of that type. In the final part of the paper,
García-Carpintero sketches how the deferred ostension theory applies to
‘double-duty’ quotation, i.e. mixed and scare quoting.
Bart GEURTS and Emar MAIER supply the second formal semantic
contribution to this issue. The initial impetus is provided by the subtle
discussion of a complex example, which leads to the conclusion that most other
theories are wrong in assuming two levels of content in mixed quotation.
Geurts & Maier propose a ‘one-dimensional’ account based on the assumption
that, rather than a quotation itself being a referential expression, it is the
meaning of a quotation (of any variety) that involves reference to a linguistic
expression. In the case of mixed quotation, this meaning can be approximated
as What x calls ‘a’. The presence of the variable “x” indicates the context
dependence of quotation. This context dependence, Geurts & Maier assume, is
presuppositional in character. To capture this, they offer an account of mixed
quotation within the framework of the ‘binding theory’ of presupposition, a
theory that takes anaphora to be a particular form of presupposition.
Mario GÓMEZ-TORRENTE defends an original semantic account on which
quotation marks are ambiguous. Even though they always involve
quantification over expressions, the various uses to which they are put are
matched by different conventional meanings. As regards ‘pure’ quotations,
Gómez-Torrente sticks to the Tarskian views of his (2001) paper: quotation
marks create a singular term that refers to the enclosed expression. As for
‘impure’ quotations (our hybrids), they are to be split into two classes. In the
first, speakers use quote marks to indicate that (something like) the enclosed
expression was uttered by a contextually relevant agent. In the second,
speakers use quote marks to distance themselves from the enclosed expression.
Both of these indications are conventional meanings because, says Gómez-
Torrente, they are not cancellable. Therefore, pragmatic accounts like
Recanati’s must fail. (This comes as a complement to other useful discussions
of cancellability by Benbaji, Cappelen & Lepore, and Reimer.) To conclude,
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let me mention one final intriguing feature of Gómez-Torrente’s contribution: a
careful scrutiny of tests devised to determine if a sentential element makes a
truth-conditional contribution leads to the conclusion that, in spite of their
conventional meaning, quote marks in impure uses do not clearly affect truth-
conditions, even in the case of speech attribution.
Expanding on his (2003) paper, Stefano PREDELLI argues that all utterances
containing a scare quote convey a ‘message’ which corresponds to what is said
by the utterance when the quote marks are removed. This, which he calls the
‘Use Hypothesis’, holds even in less congenial cases, such as when the quoted
expression is a pseudo-word (as in “These are indeed ‘subliminable’ ads”).
Predelli’s solution is as follows. Interpreters always relate the concrete tokens
they perceive to a phonographic type. This type, in turn, they associate with a
lexical item, through a process of ‘representation’. It is this represented level
that provides the input to semantic interpretation. Regarding the example with
the pseudo-word, any interpreter who understands the irony behind it will
represent the infelicitous type “subliminable” as the interpretable lexical item
“subliminal”.
Marga REIMER has probably written the paper that most readers unfamilar
with theories of quotation should begin with. She has succeeded in providing a
unique insight into the debate between proponents of the semantic and
pragmatic accounts of mixed quotation. After a careful presentation of some
counter-intuitive consequences of pragmatic accounts – in particular the
prediction that speech attribution (to the referent of the subject of the reporting
verb) can be cancelled – she proceeds to show how different pragmaticists
could respond to the objections raised by their theories. She eventually
concludes that Recanati’s framework is best equipped to take up the challenge.
However, she refuses to rule out the possibility that the best account of mixed
quotation might be semantic.
As in his (1998) paper, Paul SAKA takes the view that, in any speech act,
each expression uttered ostends a variety of things, e.g. a referent, a concept, a
phonological form. The speaker who ‘uses’ an expression intends the hearer to
focus his attention on its extension. The speaker who ‘mentions’ an expression
intends the hearer to focus his attention on one of the other ostended items.
Faced with quotations – where the speaker explicitates her intention to mention
an expression – hearers are assumed to do two things. By default, they
‘execute’ (build a mental model from) the conceptual content of the quoted
expressions. But they also recognise a mentioning intention and focus on
‘something linguistic’. This yields an appropriate analysis of hybrid instances,
since these are taken to involve simultaneous use and mention. But what of
plain mention? The hearer executes the conceptual content of the quoted
sequence, but the process fails to yield a mental model, and only the
mentioning intention ends up being interpreted. Note that Saka’s contribution
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addresses a broad range of topics. Especially noteworthy is his discussion of
the ‘Verbatim Assumption’ that seems to underlie many accounts of mixed
quotation and direct speech.
Savas TSOHATZIDIS’s paper builds on his short (1998) reply to Cappelen &
Lepore (1997). It is entirely devoted to establishing the inadequacy of
Cappelen & Lepore’s extension of Davidson’s theory. Though some might
complain that Tsohatzidis offers no alternative of his own devising and that his
contribution, therefore, is entirely negative, his attack is so methodical and the
examples supporting his arguments so appealing that his paper undeniably
deserves a place in this collection.2
Institut Jean Nicod
phdebrab@yahoo.co.uk
Notes
1 This is just for the sake of convenience. I do not wish to commit myself to the view that
removing the quote marks amounts to removing the quotation.
2 I would like to thank all the contributors for their comments on parts of this introduction.
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